manifested" its intent to apply the definition to the Labor Code. 22 Since the Labor Code was silent as to the definition of "employer," the court held that common-law agency principles governed the liability of individual corporate actors.
2 3 As a result of Reynolds, Wong and Quan escaped liability. 24 The trial court had ruled against the Wins workers on their veil piercing theory. 25 After a seven year struggle, the Wins garment workers had no recourse against the owners, despite their direct involvement in the unlawful conduct.
The California Supreme Court's decisions in Reynolds and Martinez v. Combs 26 are not anomalies. They are part of a broader trend among the state judiciary to curb legislative attempts to exempt wages from the limited liability rule. 27 The Supreme Courts of Nevada and Colorado struck down their respective wage and hour definitions, holding corporate officers and agents not personally liable. 28 These decisions fully embraced limited liability as the bedrock of the corporation, and required the legislature to manifest extraordinary intent to override traditional corporate law, despite explicit statutory language.
2 9
Yet, unlimited liability has not always been viewed as such an extraordinary privilege.
3 0 The idea that shareholders and other corporate actors should be held personally responsible for corporate acts and obligations had widespread support in America well into the nineteenth century. 3 In the last decade, a robust academic discourse has been 24. Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 258-59 (holding that under the common-law definition of "employer," Wong and Quan were not personally liable for unpaid wages and penalties).
25.
See id. at 259 (noting that the workers claimed that Wong and Quan were the alter ego of the corporations). The trial court also did not find personal liability under any of the other statutory theories, including the California unfair competition law, CAL. Bus ( claiming that in the early 1800s, limited liability was not the main benefit of incorporation).
31. See id at 338 (stating that limited liability was not necessarily provided by all states as a privilege of incorporation until the end of the nineteenth century).
taking place over the value of limited liability." There has been some recognition that limited liability places an unfair burden on some creditors. 33 Numerous commentators have recommended reworking limited liability for tort victims. 34 The plight of the wage creditors, however, has been missing from the academic discourse. Wage creditors share some of the same structural problems as tort creditors. They are involuntary creditors who have little bargaining power, and even less access to information to assess corporate risks. 36 In addition, low-wage workers face unique challenges not shared by other creditors. Low-wage workers comprise one-third of the overall workforce. 37 They work in industries with rampant wage and hour violations.
'
A comprehensive survey of low-wage industries in New 35. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 618 (1986) ("Most employees and retail consumers and many trade creditors must properly be viewed as involuntary creditors. Consequently, the group adversely affected by limited liability is much larger than a group comprised only of tort claimants.").
36. See generally id at 616-20 (discussing the unfaimess of limited liability protection for employees and labor claimants).
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., WHO ARE LoW-WAGE WORKERS? (2009) [hereinafter WHO ARE Low-WAGE WORKERS?
], available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/09/LowWageWorkers/rb.pdf. Low-wage workers are defined as those that fall below the poverty line for a family of four, even if they worked fulltime, full-year. Id. York, Chicago, and Los Angeles recently found that more than 1.1 million workers across these cities were deprived of $56.4 million of wages every week because of employment and labor law violations.
The limited liability regime leaves these workers with very little recourse when corporations file for bankruptcy, as they are increasingly doing. 40 Workers can either rely on the stringent common-law veil piercing doctrine-a vague and confusing area of the law that courts are reluctant to utilize absent extraordinary circumstances-or statutory exceptions. The FLSA has a broad definition of "employer," holding corporate individuals liable under certain circumstances.41 However, the FLSA falls far short of providing comprehensive coverage to all workers due to its coverage limits and broad exemptions. In addition, the FLSA definition focuses primarily on the control exercised by the corporate individuals. 42 In the highly stratified Wal-Mart economy, many industries like garment rely on sub-contracting, diffusing control over several layers. 4 3 Furthermore, FLSA's enforcement mechanisms are ineffective to combat abuses in low-wage industries.
The need to restructure the limited liability rule as it applies to lowwage workers' wages is more compelling than ever. As the Wins case illustrates, a simpler and more straightforward mechanism is needed to ensuring that low-wage workers recover the wages they earned. This article offers an in-depth analysis on the problems faced by wage creditors and sets forth recommendations for reform that would guarantee low-wage workers' wages, thus exempting them from the limited liability rule. Part II traces the history of the limited liability rule. Particular attention is paid to the justifications for the limited liability rule, the effect of the rule on workers, and the current exceptions to the rule. Part III discusses the genesis of wage and hour legislation as well as efforts to exempt wages from the limited liability rule under both federal and state laws. Part IV presents a comprehensive analysis of the limitations of the existing frameworks, and Part V recommends a simpler and more effective mechanism to exempt wages from the limited liability rule. Specifically, the proposal seeks to guarantee wages for low-wage workers-creating a system of strict liability for wage violations.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF LIMITED LIABILITY

A. Development of the Rule
The state has had the exclusive privilege of granting incorporation status for centuries." Scholars disagree on the precise origins of the limited liability rule, but most agree that the concept did not fully develop until the late eighteenth century. 45 Limited liability was an extraordinary privilege granted to a select few. 46 At first, legislatures granted the privilege to corporations with public functions. 47 The push to extend limited liability to manufacturing companies gradually succeeded, first in New Hampshire in 1816, and last in Rhode Island in 1847.48 By the 1840s, limited liability was more widely accepted as a tenet of corporate law. 49 Despite the trend towards limited liability into the twentieth century, there were significant jurisdictions that imposed some form of 55 Today, limited liability is the "unqualified and universal" default rule, either provided for explicitly in corporate statutes or by implication.
The rule traditionally shields shareholders and other equity stakeholders from liability of corporate debts. If the corporation fails, they lose only the value of their investment." Officers, employees, and agents also enjoy limited liability stemming from agency principles. 59 This article will use limited liability to encompass both shareholder and individual corporate actors.
B. Economic Insights from Empirical Studies
The limited liability rule was developed to encourage and safeguard investors from the risks undertaken by the entity. The "moral hazardthe incentive created by limited liability to transfer the cost of risky activities to creditors"--was justified as a necessary evil for economic growth.
6 0 Arguably, shifting the risks benefited the public by generating greater economic activity.
6 ' Equally important, limited liability was seen as democratic. As Stephen Presser notes, "the imposition of limited liability was perceived as a means of encouraging the small-scale entrepreneur, and of keeping entry into business markets competitive and democratic."
62
While the democratic goal has faded from history, the economic justification seems to have been uniformly adopted. 63 Although there is not enough empirical data to fully evaluate the economic benefits of limited liability, several studies have called into question the impact of limited liability on economic development.64
These studies all concluded that substantial industrial development took place in jurisdictions with unlimited liability. 65 For several decades in the early 1800s, New England states were a patchwork of limited and unlimited liability regimes. Massachusetts imposed unlimited liability until 1830, as did Rhode Island until 1847, while New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Maine offered limited liability.
6
By comparing states like Massachusetts and Rhode Island with limited liability states in the early 1800s, the late Harvard Professor, E. Merrick Dodd, found persuasive evidence that unlimited liability did not deter economic growth. 67 For example, Massachusetts was the leading cotton-textile state in the country at the time. 68 In 1809, there was a substantial increase in the demand for manufacturing charters in the state.
69
The same year, the Massachusetts legislature adopted a policy of imposing full unlimited individual liability on shareholders of manufacturing companies, which it followed for twentyone years.
70
The adoption of unlimited liability did not deter incorporation in Massachusetts, and in 1830-the year the state adopted limited liability-there was no corresponding increase in California provides a more modem example. It was one of the last significant jurisdictions to continue imposing unlimited liability into the early twentieth century. 75 The California Constitutions of 1849 and 1879 imposed pro rata unlimited shareholder liability for companies incorporated in California, regardless of where the debt was incurred, and for foreign corporations doing business in California for debts arising in California. 76 In 1929, the legislature amended the Constitution to allow for limited liability of any California firm by a simple name change that included the word "Limited" or "Ltd." 77 In 1930, the pro rata liability provision was repealed and finally in 1931, a new corporate code passed the legislature adopting limited liability.
78 From 1849 to 1931, the effect of pro rata liability had no adverse impact on California's economy, despite the widespread adoption of limited liability in most states. 79 California was ranked sixth in population in the forty-eight states and eighth in manufacturing output. 80 In a study of share prices for California corporations traded on the New York Stock Exchange and other stock exchanges during the time that limited liability was adopted, Mark Weinstein found no evidence of a change in share prices.8 Also, there was no significant increase in incorporation after It is nearly impossible for tort victims and workers to be efficient risk assessors or have leverage to negotiate a price for limited liability. Tort victims are unwilling participants and do not have information to assess a risk that they did not anticipate.
Tort victims, thus, cannot bargain with the corporation to either avoid the tort or provide sufficient compensation to rectify the injury. The wage creditor is most often equated with the contract creditor, as all employment rests on a contractual relationship-the selling and purchase of labor. Wages are always paid in arrears and thus, the corporation owes a debt to the worker. 97 Structurally, the individual wage earners are similar to tort victims. and assess the probability of corporate failure, and then negotiated either a higher wage or a personal guarantee based on the risk is incongruous with reality. Corporations, thus, pay no extra price for the privilege of limited liability for wage debts. Unfortunately, unlike the tort creditor, the inequality of the situation for wage creditors has not been addressed by the academy.
D. Current Exceptions to Limited Liability
Absent contracting specifically for unlimited liability (usually by securing personal guarantees), there are two main mechanisms for contravening the limited liability regime: piercing the corporate veil doctrine and statutory exceptions to the default rule.
Since the nineteenth century, courts have been willing to disregard the corporate form and pierce the veil to reach shareholders in an attempt to balance the benefits and costs of limited liability. 99 In essence, courts have looked to a multitude of factors to assess when to disregard the corporate "veil" and hold individuals personally liable for corporate transgressions. 100 There is no uniform application of the veil piercing doctrine from state to state. 101 Thus, it has been described as "among the most confusing in corporate law" and a "legal quagmire."l 100. See Millon, supra note 99, at 1330-39 (explaining that while the factors vary according to state law, courts are more likely to pierce the corporate structure when one or more of these factors are present: (1) fraud or misrepresentation; (2) using the corporation as an instrumentality, agent or "alter ego" for the activities of the dominant shareholders; (3) non-observance of corporate formalities; and (4) undercapitalization).
101.
See PRESSER, supra note 50, § 1:1 ("[T]here has been a real reluctance on the part of courts to clearly define piercing the veil standards.").
102. Id In the few cases that described the shareholder as passive, courts almost always found no liability.'o 7 Courts pierced the corporate veil significantly more in cases involving contract creditors rather than tort creditors.
08
Some legal commentators have concluded that the veil piercing doctrine is not an adequate vehicle to rectify the costs of limited liability. 09 The multi-factored test varies from state to state and gives courts wide latitude in applying the factors."l 0 Veil piercing undermines the very predictability and certainty guaranteed by limited liability, as it is difficult to ascertain when courts will pierce the corporate veil."'
In the Wins case, the workers produced evidence that Wong and Quan commingled assets, interchanging personal and corporate funds without any formality or approval process. 12 In addition, Wong and Quan operated their corporations without adherence to any corporate formalities.' 3 Despite this evidence and supporting case law, the trial court did not find alter ego liability.114 As Stephen Bainbridge observed, the veil piercing doctrine "allows judges to impose their own brand of rough justice without being overly concerned with precedent or appellate review.""
5
While debate continues as to the effectiveness of the veil piercing doctrine, in the last several decades, Congress adopted explicit statutory Since antiquity, wages have been considered special debts because of the unique nature of the labor contract."' Workers provide a value to their employer in exchange for wages, which they depend on for their survival.1 9 Labor conditions have changed very little for workers at the bottom-they perform the same repetitive tasks for wages that barely meet their minimum needs.1 2 0
Without legislative intervention, lowwage workers suffered exploitative conditions and substandard wages due to the employers' superior bargaining power, causing detriment not only to their welfare but also to the public.121
By the end of the nineteenth century, rapid industrialization, the influx of new immigrants, and the shift to factory production further 117. 
A. Genesis of Wage and Hour Legislation
One tool at the disposal of the states was the police power. The judiciary had long recognized the inherent power of the states to regulate in the interest of the public's safety, health, morals, and general welfare.1 2 4
Prior to 1870, the states sparingly utilized their police powers to pass social legislation.1 2 5 In the 1880s, however, states began to broadly exercise its power, especially in the arena of employment.1 2 6
As mining and manufacturing industries developed, every state passed legislation regulating the health and safety of the workplace in some manner. For instance, lawmakers regulated fire escapes in large buildings including factories, protected workers from accidental contact with dangerous machinery, and ensured the cleanliness and ventilation of working rooms.1 2 7 States also began to affirmatively set maximum hours and minimum wages, first for women and children, and eventually for all workers in all industries.1 2 8
122. See HURST, supra note 83, at 71-72. The non-agricultural labor force more than doubled in a century from 28% in 1820 to 62% by 1900. Id The Constitution protected the "right to purchase or to sell labor."' 3 ' Central to this belief was the judiciary's assumption that the worker was on equal footing with the employer in negotiating the contract:
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it. . . . In all such particulars the employer and the employ6 have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in a free land. 
The next battle was over who was covered under these laws.
B. The Evolution ofIndividual Corporate Liability for Wage Violations
Congress and some states went further than just safeguarding wages and creating minimum standards. They recognized that the traditional master-servant relationship left too many workers without protection and no remedy when corporations failed. Thus, reshaping the employeremployee relationship became central to some wage and hour legislation including FLSA.1 43 Under the common-law, the employment relationship was characterized as between the master and servant, wherein "the employer retains the right to direct the manner in which the business shall be done, as well as the result to be accomplished, or, in other words, "not only what shall be done, but how it shall be done. Too many workers fell outside the scope of the common-law test because of its singular focus on control over the work performed by the individual.
14 5
The term employer was also narrowly construed to the entity that hired and contracted with the worker.1 4 6
For corporate entities, the limited liability rule protected individual corporate actors from personal liability.
14 7
There were two strains in the evolution of individual corporate liability for unpaid wages of workers-strict liability and control-based liability.1 48 In the late 1800s, legislatures experimented with creating shareholder wage guarantees.
14 9 While very few of those laws survive today, California recently enacted a wage guarantee system in the garment industry. 150 On the other end of the spectrum are the FLSA and some state wage and hour definitions of employer that hold corporate individuals, who exercise control over the entity or labor relations, personally liable for violations. 151
Shareholder Surety Laws
In the 1800s, vigorous debates about the usefulness of the corporate form and the limited liability rule ensued.1 52 Many state legislators were in favor of direct shareholder liability to protect creditors, but populists viewed the limited liability rule as a "mode of swindling" and "a fraud on the honest and confiding part of the public."' Central to the debate 
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was the issue of retaining unlimited liability for workers' wages. New York considered the policy reason for why shareholders should be liable for wage debts.
What class shall be thus favored, in whole or in part . . . ? Shall it be the farmer, the merchant, the blacksmith, the day laborer, the lawyer, the doctor, the carpenter, the mechanic of any kind? No, not any one man, nor men in common, but the capitalists, and those of all others best able to pay their debts.
154
In 1848, New York adopted a very broad shareholder wage lien law: "The stockholders of any company organized under the provisions of this act, shall be jointly and severally individually liable for all debts that may be due and owing to all their laborers, servants and apprentices, for services performed for such corporation." 15 5 Other states followed suit with similar language. These laws varied, but in essence, they imposed strict liability on shareholders for unpaid wages incurred for a limited period of time. 56 Some laws imposing liability on shareholders for unpaid wages survived into the twentieth century. Most of the litigation surrounding the surety laws centered on the scope of coverage. 163 Many courts viewed the surety laws as applying to a narrow scope of employees, those at the bottom-end who needed special protection.'" Most states abandoned the shareholder surety laws in favor of limited liability.
Broad Employer Coverage under the FLSA
The FLSA has one of most expansive definitions of employeremployee, neither restrained by common-law concepts nor restricted by contract.' 65 Under the FLSA, multiple simultaneous employers may be responsible for compliance.
6
The FLSA defines an employer in a circular way as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee."l67 An employee is defined as "any individual employed by an employer." With respect to liability for corporate individuals, courts seldom apply the "economic reality" test, focusing instead on the acts of the individual.1' The presence of one of these crucial factors will result in liability for corporate individuals: (1) operational control, (2) substantial role in setting personnel policies and/or control over the employees, and/or (3) knowing participation in the violation.1 2 While there is no consistent approach to trigger corporate individual liability under FLSA, the overwhelming majority of circuit courts impose personal liability where operational control over the day-to-day management and/or vis-i-vis the employees exists. In Agnew, two shareholders held all corporate offices and ran the day-to-day management of the company. 1 7 They had substantial control over personnel matters, including hiring, firing, and payroll.'" They paid other obligations and/or retained profits 170. See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2003) (identifying a fourfactor, five-factor, and seven-factor test, all active in the Second Circuit and applicable under different circumstances). Interestingly, the "economic reality" test was developed under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), which did not explicitly define the employer-employee relationship. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944) . In the absence of clear statutory language under the NLRA and the expansive scope of that statute, the Supreme Court in Hearst Publications rejected the narrow common-law test and adopted a test that looked at "underlying economic facts," such as the degree of control, opportunities for profit or loss, investment in facilities, permanency of relations, and skill required. [We do not] think too much weight can be put on the Act's broadly inclusive definition of "employer." Taken literally and applied in this context it would make any supervisory employee, even those without any control over the corporation's payroll, personally liable for the unpaid or deficient wages of other employees.
In other circuits, supervisory employees without ownership interests were liable for FLSA violations.
In Reich v. Circle C. Investments, Inc.,' 88 the individual defendant had a consulting agreement with the plaintiffs company, which excluded personnel matters from his responsibilities.1 89 He did not have any ownership interest and did not control the day-to-day operations.' 90 The Fifth Circuit, nevertheless, found him to be an employer, because he hired some of the workers, supervised workers and gave specific instructions to some, signed worker's payroll checks, and issued memos to workers about policies and procedures.' 9 '
The FLSA definition of employer has not been adopted wholesale by states. State wage and hour laws provide an additional layer of protection, and in some instances, provide greater protection than the FLSA.1 9 2 The lack of uniform treatment of corporate individuals among states leaves many workers without a mechanism to recover their wages. 
Piecemeal Individual Corporate Liability Among States
As varied as corporate law is from state to state, the same is true for state wage and hour laws. Under most wage and hour laws, there are two sections governing unpaid wages: wage payment and collection and minimum wage. The wage payment and collection section focuses on prompt payment of wages, payment of wages upon termination, and private right of action for unpaid wages. The minimum wage section guarantees a minimum wage and, in most states, has its own enforcement mechanism.' 93 Before the passage of the FLSA, few states embraced the scope of the "suffer or permit" language outside of child labor statutes.'
94
Following FLSA, two-thirds of the states adopted the FLSA definitions for "employ" and "employer" under their minimum wage laws. 95 However, more than three-quarters of the states did not extend the expansive definitions to the general wage collections section.1 9 6
In extending liability to corporate officers and agents, states generally define employer in one of three ways under the general wage 194. See Goldstein et al., supra note 1, at 1016. In the early 1900s, the California and Texas wage boards--charged with investigating work conditions in various occupations and industries as well as setting minimum standards-used the "suffer or permit" language. See id. at 1076.
195. Under the minimum wage laws, thirty states define employ to include "to suffer or permit" or "permit" and define employer to include "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer." An additional three states define an employee as an individual "suffered or permitted" to work. Two states, Alaska and Florida, explicitly incorporate the FLSA definitions for minimum wage violations. The rationale for extending liability to officers and agents is captured aptly by the Pennsylvania State Appellate Court's interpretation of the definition of employer. Under its general wage payment act, Pennsylvania explicitly enumerates agents and officers in the definition of employer.
2 00 The Court stated:
Thus, we see no logic in imposing the brunt of this financial fiasco on those so attenuated from the core of the fault as to be absolved from any wrongdoing,.. . and place the obligation on the shoulders of those who make the decisions as to the manner in which the Corporation is managed. 
Guaranteeing Wages: California's AB 633
California has long held the distinction of being the garment sweatshop capital of the nation. 202 Labor advocates recognized that the existing legal frameworks did little to penetrate the industry's subcontracting structure, which ensured noncompliance with wage and hour laws. 203 In 1999, after years of advocacy and targeted litigation, the California legislature passed AB 633, a historical bill negotiated by labor advocates and the retail and apparel industries. In essence, the manufacturers became the "guarantors" for the garment workers' wages. 20 7 Liability is simply premised on whether the manufacturer did business with the contractor during the time of the wage violations.
208
The guarantee can only be enforced through an administrative complaint process with the Labor Commissioner. The original language in AB 633 allowed for a private right of action to enforce the wage guarantee.
21 0 The retail and apparel industries strongly resisted the inclusion of private enforcement.211 Labor advocates struggled over the political roadblock. limitation of AB 633 is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner in enforcing the guarantee.
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING FRAMEWORKS
Holding shareholders and corporate actors personally liable for corporate debts is neither a novel nor untested theory. Yet, the existing frameworks have done little to deter noncompliance with wage and hour laws. The problem lies both in the scope and breadth of individual corporate liability and enforcement.
A. Enforcement and Coverage of the FLSA
While the FLSA has been lauded for its expansive coverage, the law falls far short of covering all workers. The FLSA has a host of exemptions, which carve out certain workers from the protections of minimum wage and/or overtime laws. 224 These exemptions are broader than state wage and hour laws, exempting not only certain executive, administrative, and professional employees but also outside sales employees, home health care companions, and computer analysts to name a few. 225 The result is that large classes of low-wage workers are not covered under the FLSA.
26
Furthermore, FLSA's individual corporate liability centers on operational control. The singular focus on control fails to reach a whole host of employment relationships that rely on sub-contracting.227 Garment, construction, and janitorial industries, for example, are structured such that control is diffused through several entities.228 Those at the top of the sub-contracting hierarchy dictate the conditions and price structures that result in violations at the bottom. 229 The control test may not reach far enough up the chain to hold accountable those that set Furthermore, WHD failed to utilize the full panoply of remedies at its disposal, including assessing penalties.
23 4 Finally, the WHD failed to maximize its outreach programs to inform workers of their rights under the FLSA. 235 In 2009, the GAO released a report on the inability of WHD to adequately investigate complaints from low-wage workers.
23 6 "Posing as fictitious complainants, the GAO filed 10 common complaints with WHD district offices across the country. The undercover tests revealed sluggish response times, a poor complaint intake process, and failed conciliation attempts, among other problems."
237
The GAO investigation concluded that low-wage workers cannot rely on the DOL to effectively assist them in recovering wages. 238 The Wins workers certainly felt that way after the DOL settled their wage claims for far Workers are thus left to enforce violations of FLSA on their owna daunting task for low-wage and immigrant workers. Most low-wage workers face significant barriers to effective redress. Lack of access to counsel is one major obstacle.
24 0 Low-wage workers cannot afford to hire private attorneys on an hourly rate. Furthermore, their individual cases are often too small to attract representation on a contingency fee basis. 241 The nature of the FLSA class action is a further impediment for low-wage workers. Unlike discrimination claims under Title VII, the 242 FLSA has an "opt-in" provision for collective action.2 In essence, workers must affirmatively give consent to be included in any collective action.
2 43 For many low-wage workers, the fear of reprisal from their employer and lack of understanding of the class notice prevents them 244 from participating in FLSA class actions.
As a result, the FLSA opt- 60 The court found that the legislature had not specifically expressed its intent to graft the wage order definition to the Labor Code, despite the fact that the legislature amended the Labor Code several times after the regulatory definition was adopted.
26 1 Five years later, the California Supreme Court in Martinez reversed itself by holding that the wage order definitions did apply to Labor Code proceedings. 262 Martinez went further and stated that the wage order definition of employer did not impose liability on individual corporate agents acting within the scope of their agency. 263 Reynolds, however, never reached the scope of the regulatory definition, because it held that the definition did not apply to the claim.
2 64 Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court in Martinez narrowed the scope of the wage order definition to not reach corporate agents.
The judicial onslaught to defend the bedrock of corporate law undermines legislative efforts to realign corporate interests with labor rights. These decisions roll back vital worker protective legislation. The concurrence in Reynolds urged legislative action to fix the legal gap in coverage.
5 V. THE NEED FOR GUARANTEEING WAGES
Individual corporate accountability for noncompliance with minimum standards, which safeguard subsistence living, should be the cornerstone of wage and hour legislation. The Federal Government and the states have enacted significant worker protective legislation to safeguard wages as special debts that must be paid promptly. These statutory protections, however, are hollow without a remedy. When businesses go bankrupt and corporate individuals are shielded from liability, workers are vulnerable and left without a remedy. 
LOW-WAGE WORKERS'ACCESS
During the long struggle to establish minimum wage standards, the Supreme Court finally realized that the burden of wage exploitation fell on society:
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenceless against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health and well being but casts a direct burden for their support upon the community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay . . .. The community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers. 267 The same rationale applies to workers who have no bargaining power to leverage personal guarantees or other premiums for the risks of limited liability. Corporations pay no price for the risks they undertake, forcing society to shoulder the burden when they fail. Thus, efforts must be directed at restructuring the very mechanism that deprives workers of their ability to recover wages.
Because of the relative low bargaining power of the low-wage worker and the high noncompliance in low-wage industries with basic minimum standards, this Article proposes an expansion of the AB 633 guarantor system to other low-wage industries, with an explicit mechanism for private enforcement. The wage guarantee is no different than a contract creditor requiring, in certain circumstances, personal guarantees in their corporate dealings. Because low-wage workers have no real bargaining power, Congress and the states should secure wage guarantees through legislation.
The legislation should include a few key mechanisms that are not currently in the AB 633 model. To have the greatest breadth of coverage, legislation should target low-wage industries. Low-wage industries can be identified as those employing front-line workers (nonsupervisors, non-professional, non-technical workers) who earn less than 85% of the median wage in their area. 268 Furthermore, the wage guarantee should not be limited to minimum wage workers. The government identifies low-wage workers as those who earn below the poverty line for a family of four, even if they 267. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937). 268. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 38, at 56. While there are different methodologies used to identify low-wage industries, the approach by Annette Bernhardt and her research team in the most recent, comprehensive report on low-wage workers seems a sufficient means for identifying these industries.
worked full-time, full-year.
2 69 Under the government's methodology, a low-wage worker makes an hourly wage of $10.50 or less.
27 0 Workers who earn slightly more than minimum wage, but below the poverty line, are subject to the same exploitation and face the same vulnerabilities as minimum wage workers. Thus, the guarantee should encompass them.
The model language for the wage guarantee should be as follows:
To ensure that employees are paid for all hours worked, any person who employs or contracts with another person for the performance of goods or services shall guarantee payment of wages that are due to the employees performing the work.
Furthermore, "person" should be defined as:
Any individual, firm, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability company, or joint stock association. A person includes shareholders, any person with equity interest, and directors and officers of a corporation or limited liability company.
The wage guarantee for targeted low-wage industries will do more to reform the flagrant disregard for basic minimum wage standards. If individuals higher on the sub-contracting ladder are responsible for guaranteeing that workers be paid their wages, it is easy to imagine that better systems will be put into place to prevent or dissuade noncompliance with wages.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nineteenth-century legislators protected creditors by instituting varying degrees of unlimited liability for corporations. The early history of unlimited liability, particularly as applied to workers' wages, has been long forgotten. Because of political necessity, rather than economic necessity, limited liability came to dominate legal jurisprudence. Flawed reasoning as to who could bear the risks more efficientlycreditor or investor-helped excuse the unfairness of the rule.
Aware of the possibilities for grave injustices to workers, Congress and some states rewrote the common-law rule. The FLSA and some state wage and hour laws explicitly hold corporate individuals personally liable for wage violations. However, these existing structures' singular focus on control fails to penetrate the structural problems in low-wage industries that ensure rampant wage and hour violations.
Corporate interests have long dominated the development of corporate laws, undercutting other societal values.
For workers, especially those already toiling at the margins, the ability to recover their earned wages should not hinge on the corporate structure. Two dual conditions make this legislative reform a paramount necessity: noncompliance with wage and hours laws has become rampant, and corporate bankruptcies have steadily grown. Without legislative action and a uniform standard across all jurisdictions, workers like the immigrant women who worked at Wins will be left without any recourse to recover the money that is owed to them.
The time for a simpler and more effective means to recover unpaid wages is upon us. As California and earlier shareholder surety laws demonstrate, a wage guarantee system is neither a novel nor untested idea. Low-wage workers need assurance that they will be compensated for their labor. Guaranteeing wages for these workers helps to rectify the unfairness and inequity of the limited liability rule.
